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Abstract
There is evidence that countries trade votes among each other in international institutions on a
wide range of issues, including the use of force, trade issues and elections of judges. Vote-trading
has been criticized as being a form of corruption, undue influence and coercion. Contrary to
common wisdom, however, I argue in this paper that the case for introducing policy measures
against vote-trading cannot be made out on the basis of available evidence. This paper sets out an
analytical framework for analyzing vote-trading in international institutions, focusing on three
major contexts in which vote-trading may generate benefits and costs: (1) agency costs (collective
good), (2) coercive tendering and (3) agency costs (constituents). The applicability of each context
depends primarily on the type of decision in question – i.e. preference-decision or judgmentdecision – and the interests that countries are expected to maximize when voting. The analytical
framework is applied to evidence of vote-trading in four institutions, the Security Council, the
General Assembly, the World Trade Organization and the International Whaling Commission. The
application of the analysis reveals that while vote-trading can create significant costs, there is only
equivocal evidence to this effect, and in several cases vote-trading generates important benefits.
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VOTE-TRADING IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Ofer Eldar
1. Introduction
Vote-trading is prevalent in international institutions. Vote-trading is largely unregulated, and the
incentives to sell and buy votes can be particularly high. There is evidence that countries trade
votes among each other on a wide range of issues, including, the use of force, trade issues and
elections of judges. Vote-trading in international institutions often involves deals between wealthy
countries and poor countries. Poor countries have a greater incentive to sell their votes because
payments are usually worth more to a poor country than to a wealthy country.1 Furthermore,
current voting rules based on the equality of sovereigns provide extensive voting powers to many
small countries on matters that they care little about.2 Therefore, small countries have a strong
incentive to sell their votes. There is also an extensive demand for votes, as the decisions of
international institutions have a growing impact on countries. Wealthy countries have ample
resources to buy votes, and the price of votes is not necessarily high. The superpowers, especially
the US, can buy poorer countries’ votes by utilizing their aid allocations or securing loans from the
World Bank or the IMF,3 and the price for a vote is often a vote on another issue.
The practice of vote-trading usually carries a moral stigma. Vote-trading is widely criticized by
commentators as being a form of corruption, undue influence, and even coercion. In most
countries there are domestic laws that prohibit agreements based on the exchange of goods or
money for votes. There is also an ongoing international effort to stop voting transactions in
elections in developing countries.4 Common wisdom would thus suggest that the practice of votetrading should be made illegal in international law as in domestic systems. Contrary to this view,
however, I argue in this paper that the case for introducing policy measures against vote-trading in
international institutions cannot be made on the basis of available evidence. While vote-trading
can create significant costs, it can also generate important benefits. There is only equivocal
evidence to suggest that the costs outweigh the benefits, and in certain instances the evidence
indicates that vote-trading is welfare-maximizing.
In Part 2, I set out an analytical framework for analyzing vote-trading in international
institutions. The main criterion I use in this paper is efficiency or global welfarism.5 In particular, I
seek to identify the various costs and benefits of vote-trading and the contexts in which such costs
and benefits may arise. I identify three specific contexts in which vote-trading has economic
effects: (1) agency costs (collective good), (2) coercive tendering, and (3) agency costs
1

For an explanation in the context of domestic vote-trading, see Richard L. Hasen, ‘Vote Buying’, 88 Cal. L. Rev.
(2000) 1323, at 1329.
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John H. Jackson, ‘Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept’, 97 AJIL (2003) 782, at 797.
This paper does not discuss reform of voting mechanisms.
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Such loans are more valuable to recipient countries than they are costly to the major shareholders, especially the
US; Erik Voeten, ‘Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action’, 95(4) American Political Science
Review (2001) 845, at 853. In this paper I ignore the potentially harmful effect of such vote-trading on decisions of the
IMF and the World Bank.
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Transparency International, Global Corruption Report (2004), at 76-87.
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The welfare or wellbeing of the global community as a whole, including its member states and people, needs to be
considered. For a discussion of welfarism in international law, see Eric Posner, 'International Law: A Welfarist
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(constituents). The main factor in determining which of these three contexts is relevant in specific
cases is the type of voting decision in question and the interests that each country is expected to
maximize when voting. In each of the three contexts vote-trading can have both beneficial and
harmful effects. In addition to welfarism, I discuss the distributional effects of vote-trading in
specific contexts where it may increase inequalities among countries.6 In Part 3, I apply the
analytical framework to specific case studies in four international institutions: the Security
Council (‘SC’), the General Assembly (‘GA’), the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) and the
International Whaling Commission (‘IWC’). I have chosen these institutions because there is solid
evidence of vote-trading in each of these institutions and because these institutions engage in a
wide array of international activities. Part 4 concludes.
2. Analytical Framework
This part is divided into three sections. The first defines the various categories of vote-trading. The
second defines the two main types of decisions that international institutions are responsible for:
preference-decisions and judgment-decisions. The third sets out the main contexts in which votetrading has economic consequences and the type of decision and circumstances in which such
consequences will arise.
A. Categories of Vote-Trading
Vote-trading may take the form of two main types of exchanges. The first type is outright votebuying, which I define as any conditioning of value on voting for a particular outcome, except
logrolling (as defined below). Vote-buying may take the form of one country offering payment to
another to vote in a particular way (‘carrot’). It may also take the form of a threat by a country
(short of direct coercion7) to withhold a certain benefit ('stick'), e.g. bilateral aid, the consideration
for the vote being the continued provision of that benefit.8 The second type of vote-trading is
logrolling. Logrolling differs from vote-buying in that the consideration for the vote is a vote on
another issue. V1 votes on issue A for an outcome favored by V2, and in exchange V2 votes on
issue B for an outcome favored by V1.9 Logrolling may involve exchanges of votes within the
same institution ('internal-logrolling'), but it may also involve an exchange of a vote in one
institution for a vote in another institution ('external-logrolling'). I emphasize that I make no
distinction between votes and decisions. Thus I treat cases where countries form a logrolling
majority to pass a package of decisions, although there is only one formal vote on these decisions,
and cases where there is a separate vote in respect of each different decision and countries enter
logrolling agreements prior to the vote on each decision, in the same way. I use the term logrolling
to refer to any and all types of logrolling. I use the term vote-trading to refer to any and all types of
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I limit the discussion of the distributional effects to cases where vote-trading maximizes welfare, but harms the
poor. In these cases, the welfare analysis on its own is unsatisfactory for determining policy.
7
I define 'direct coercion' as a threat by a country to do something which it is not entitled to do under international
legal norms.
8
It may be argued that threats to withdraw benefits constitute coercion. However, international law does not
prohibit such threats. While poor countries may be dependent on bilateral benefits, in the absence of a legal duty to
provide these benefits, their withdrawal may be regarded as a legitimate use of donors’ resources.
9
I use the term 'vote-buyer' to refer not only to countries engaged in vote-buying, but also to countries engaged in
logrolling. A country that wishes decision A to be adopted will buy a vote on decision A and will sell its vote on
decision B.
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vote-trading.10
B. Categories of Decisions
The decisions of international institutions may be divided into two main types. The first type is
'preference-decisions'. In preference-decisions, countries are expected to vote in accordance with
their individual interests or preferences in order to maximize their individual gains. Voters have no
duty to consider the collective good or the interests of other countries when they choose how to
vote. Thus there is no risk that the collective good will be compromised when countries pursue
their individual interests. Most voting decisions in the domestic context are preference-decisions.
In domestic elections people can vote for their preferred candidates without considering how their
vote would affect others.11 By contrast, there are only few voting decisions in international
institutions that are preference-decisions, most notably, as explained below, the decisions of the
WTO. I also emphasize that in international institutions the actual voters are governments. While
governments have no duty towards other countries, they are expected to maximize the benefit to
their own constituents.
The second type of decisions is ‘judgment-decisions’. In judgment-decisions, countries are
expected to consider the collective good or the interests of other governments and peoples rather
than their own individual interests. Such decisions involve a judgment as to which result would
best serve the interests of the international community. In judgment-decisions, voters have a duty
to vote for decisions that maximize the collective good. Voters act as agents for other governments
and peoples to consider the latter's interests and maximize their sum preferences. In the domestic
context, relatively few voting decisions are judgment-decisions. For example, judges cannot
exercise their subjective preferences when deciding a case, but need to consider the collective
good in accordance with certain laws and norms. By contrast, in the international context, many
decisions are judgment-decisions. As I discuss below, countries in the SC, the GA and the IWC
have an express duty to maximize the collective good in making certain decisions.
I emphasize that the distinction between preference-decisions and judgment-decisions is not
always easy to make and is to some extent a matter of degree. Nonetheless, for the sake of
convenience, I will assume that the distinction is clear-cut and seek to categorize the decisions of
each institution as either preference-decisions or judgment-decisions.
C. Rationale For and Against Vote-Trading
The reasons for restricting or permitting vote-trading in the domestic context have been
extensively discussed in other scholarly work.12 In summary, it is fair to state that while most
commentators believe that vote-buying in political decisions, such as elections, should be
prohibited, opinions on the practice of logrolling are more equivocal. There is a greater divergence
of opinion, though, as to why vote-buying and logrolling should or should not be prohibited. I do
10

I also note that the term 'bloc' or 'coalition' may involve vote-trading, but also countries voting for a common
interest.
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Another example of preference-decisions is voting by shareholders in corporations.
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See Hasen, supra note 1; Saul Levmore, ‘Voting with Intensity’, 53 Stan. L. Rev. (2000) 111; Ettore Scimemi,
‘Vote-trading in Corporate America’, 14(4) EBLR (2003) 445; Thomas Stratmann, ‘Logrolling’, in Dennis Mueller
(ed), Perspectives on Public Choice Theory (1997) 322; Zohar Goshen, ‘Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule
or Liability Rule?’, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. (1997) 741; Kochin & Kochin, ‘When is Buying Votes Wrong?’, 97 Public
Choice (1998) 645.
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not seek to assess this literature in this paper. While I draw in some instances on arguments made
in the domestic context, I focus on dealing with the specific issues that vote-trading entails in
international institutions.
In examining vote-trading the main criterion I employ is welfarism. The basic starting point of
welfarism is that vote-trading, like any other transaction, maximizes welfare. A vote-trading
agreement presumptively increases the wellbeing of the parties to the agreement. The basic
presumption can be modified or supplemented in three different contexts: First, in judgmentdecisions, vote-trading can generate benefits or costs to the international community at large.
Second, in preference-decisions, coercive tendering practices employed by vote-buyers can
impose costs on vote-sellers and other third parties, where vote-sellers are forced to sell their votes
for unfair prices, but they can also generate efficient decisions and obstruct holdout attempts.
Third, in preference-decisions, vote-trading can generate costs or benefits for the constituents of
the vote-traders themselves. In the following sub-sections I discuss each of these contexts in
greater detail.
I emphasize that vote-trading may also have distributional effects. In the context of agency
costs (collective good) and agency costs (constituents), distributional issues are already
incorporated into the welfare analysis to the extent that distributional considerations need to be
considered in assessing the effects of vote-trading on the collective good or welfare of
constituents, and therefore a distributional analysis is unlikely to add much over and above the
welfare analysis. By contrast, as I explain below, distributional concerns are analytically
significant in the context of coercive tendering in preference-decisions. Accordingly, I discuss
distributional concerns only in the context of coercive tendering.
1. Agency Costs (Collective Good)
We need to examine in which circumstances the pursuit of individual interests through votetrading harms or benefits the collective good. This primarily depends on the type of decision in
question.
(a) Preference-decisions:
In preference-decisions, no harm is caused to the collective good when countries trade their votes
to further their interests, as countries are expected to pursue their own interests anyway. In fact,
subject to other costs discussed below, vote-trading maximizes aggregate welfare. Vote-trading
not only increases the wellbeing of the parties to the agreement, but also allows voters to register
the intensity of their preferences by enabling them to sell votes when they do not care much about
the outcome and buy votes on matters they feel strongly about.13 A system that registers intensity
of preferences is prima facie more efficient because it better reflects the aggregate of individual
preferences.14
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Stratmann, Ibid., at 325; Hasen, Ibid., at 1343.
Kochin & Kochin, supra note 12. In specific preference-decisions any vote-trading transaction may inflict costs on
others, and such costs may be larger than the benefits to the parties to the vote-trading; for mathematical expositions
see Hasen, supra note 1; Scimemi, supra note 12. However, as Kochin and Kochin show, there is no reason to believe
a priori that on average such costs will be larger than the benefits. The key issue is to identify the circumstances where
vote-trading generates more costs than benefits. As discussed below, in international vote-trading, I identify these
circumstances to exist in the context of coercive tendering practices under certain conditions.
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(b) Judgment-decisions:
In judgment-decisions the question is whether vote-trading generates outcomes that reduce or
maximize the collective good. Countries generally enter into vote-trading agreements to further
their own interests.15 When the pursuit of self-interest via vote-trading comes at the expense of the
collective good, vote-trading entails agency costs. Some agency costs, though, are already inherent
in many judgment-decisions because, even without vote-trading, countries already vote inevitably
with a view to maximizing their individual preferences at the expense of the collective good. The
effects of vote-trading in judgment-decisions thus depend on a comparison of the result but for the
vote-trading and the result facilitated by the vote-trading from the standpoint of the collective
good. Accordingly, vote-trading is harmful when it leads to decisions ('bad-decisions') that are
more harmful to the collective good than the decisions that would otherwise be adopted or the
overall result if no such decisions were adopted. This would happen where, but for the votetrading, countries would vote for decisions that better maximize the collective good ('gooddecisions').16 Countries have preferences for good-decisions ('good-preferences') for two main
reasons. The first is altruism, which I define as a concern for the collective good. However, as
pointed out by Posner, altruism in international relations is generally weak.17 The second is
individual interest in a good-decision, i.e., the country will benefit from a decision that maximizes
the collective good.
Vote-trading can actually be welfare-maximizing, when it ameliorates agency costs caused by
countries voting in their self-interest. This type of effect will occur where, but for the vote-trading,
countries would vote for decisions that maximize their own personal interests (also, 'baddecisions'), in circumstances where the vote-trading itself provides them with an incentive to vote
for decisions that would better maximize the collective good (also, 'good-decisions'). When a
country is faced with a choice whether to vote for a good-decision that is contrary to its individual
interests or a bad-decision that promotes its interests, it is very likely to form a preference for the
latter ('bad-preference')18 rather than the former (i.e., a good-preference). The consideration for the
vote can provide an incentive for a country with a bad-preference to vote for a good-decision. One
possibility is that a vote-buyer will buy votes of countries with bad-preferences in order to pursue
a good-decision (the 'benevolent vote-buyer'). Take, for example, a vote-buyer that buys the votes
of a small minority that insists on blocking a good-decision. The benevolent vote-buyer's good
preferences will not necessarily derive from altruism, but can - and usually will - derive also from
its own individual interests. A second possibility is where two countries (or two different blocs of
countries) that have opposing preferences commit to vote for a package of policies that maximize
the collective good (an 'efficient logrolling compromise') instead of voting their own badpreferences in specific decisions. Any country is concerned that if it votes its judgment on issues
that implicate its own interests, it will not only lose on these specific issues, but if other countries
generally vote their interests, it stands to gain less from its membership in the institution than the
other countries that free-ride on that country's fulfilling its duty to vote for the collective good.
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I ignore in this paper a legal argument that vote-trading in pursuit of self-interest violates per se countries' duty to
maximize the collective good.
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A good-decision need not be optimal. It is sufficient that it is better than the decision that would be adopted but for
the vote-trading.
17
Posner, supra note 5, at 521-522.
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I assume for the sake of simplicity that bad-preferences always stem from personal interest, though they may also
stem from mistaken judgments.
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Logrolling can facilitate welfare-maximizing policies by giving countries the assurance that they
will not lose to other countries by respecting their duty to vote for the collective good.
There are two main factors that can influence the pattern and effect of vote-trading transactions.
The first is countries' preferences. The risk to the collective good is higher where vote-buyers have
strong bad-preferences and vote-sellers have no preferences at all or weak good-preferences. On
the other hand, the stronger the good-preferences of the putative vote-sellers, the higher the price
they will charge for their vote, and the more likely it is that a vote-buyer with a bad-preference
will not have sufficient resources or willingness to pay this price. Likewise, the stronger the goodpreferences of a benevolent vote-buyer, the more resources it will be ready to invest in order to
bring about a good-decision.
Second, to the extent that information is available on vote-trading agreements, countries that
take part in such agreements can be subject to reputational costs. When information on votetrading is available, vote-traders suffer harm to their reputation because they are perceived as
acting in their self-interest rather than respecting their duty to maximize the collective good. Such
reputational costs can provide countries with weak incentives to refuse to engage in vote-trading.
We would expect reputational costs to be higher the greater the actual harm to the collective good
and lesser when the vote-trading benefits the collective good. However, this will partly depend on
the specific interests and views of interested countries and NGOs that may not always be the best
agents of the collective good. Thus, countries and NGOs may criticize and harm the reputation of
countries engaged in vote-trading that leads to a good-decision if they object to that good-decision.
I emphasize that the application of the above analysis to specific case studies suffers from two
methodological problems, which can create uncertainty in evaluating the consequences of votetrading.
First, in order to define the collective good and decide whether or not vote-trading increases or
reduces it, we must make difficult empirical determinations concerning the aggregate welfare of
all people. A precise evaluation of global aggregate welfare is not possible. In the absence of an
accurate measure for making such an evaluation, other proxies have to be used. The wording of
the relevant treaty is the first place to start in defining the collective good. The treaty will normally
state the purposes of the institution and its voting decisions, and the considerations that countries
must take into account when voting. However, the wording of the treaty taken literally may not be
conclusive. Preferences may have changed over time so that the express wording of the treaty no
longer fully reflects the collective good, and an expansive interpretation is required in order to
accommodate changing preferences. It may be necessary to consider other factors as evidence of
where the collective good lies, including countries' views and practices, global public opinion,
media reports and empirical intuitions about global consensus. These factors are often subject to
divergent views, and accordingly which view of the collective good should be adopted will often
be subject to debate.
Second, as explained above, when examining the effects of vote-trading on the collective good
we need to examine the likely outcomes but for the vote-trading. The non-adoption of the decision
facilitated via vote-trading is not the only consequence to be considered, but also any unilateral
action or consequence outside the institution which might result if the relevant decision is not
accepted. Although it is possible to evaluate the political outcomes if not for the vote-trading by
considering countries' positions and practices as indicators of potential outcomes, estimates of
such outcomes will inevitably involve some degree of speculation and uncertainty.
7

2. Coercive Tendering
Vote-trading can give rise to strategic problems of coercive tendering. The effects of coercive
tendering are particularly relevant in preference-decisions.
(a) Preference-decisions:
Vote-trading, as explained above, is prima facie efficient in preference-decisions. This
presumption of efficiency is based on the assumption that parties enter willingly into vote-trading
agreements. This assumption does not necessarily hold when strategic behavior places voters in a
situation where they are forced into making coerced choices. A vote is coerced where voters sell
their vote in circumstances in which they rationally believe that they have no reasonable chance of
winning the vote. In these circumstances, it is rational for voters to sell their vote even for a price
which is less than the value of the benefit that they sincerely believe they will obtain by exercising
their voting right ('fair value'),19 because otherwise they will be left with less valuable or worthless
rights. However, coercive tendering will not necessarily be inefficient or unfair. As I explain
below, when putative vote-sellers demand a price, which is higher than the fair value of their
votes, coercive tendering may be welfare-maximizing. The following discussion considers first the
elements of coercive tendering, and then explains the circumstances in which coercive tendering is
inefficient and/or unfair or alternatively leads to efficient results.
i) The elements of coercive tendering:
Coercive tendering practices are present when three elements are satisfied: a pressure to tender,
collective action problems, and no competition for votes.
(1) Pressure to tender: We need to consider the source of the pressure on voters to make
coerced choices. In vote-trading in domestic systems, such as electorates or public corporations,
the relative power of each vote to affect outcomes and the benefit to each voter from making an
informed choice are usually trivial. Thus, there is a strong incentive to sell votes to make some
gain. Each voter knows that other voters also have a strong incentive to sell their votes. Knowing
that there is a high probability that other voters will sell their votes and that the vote-buyer will
win the vote, it is rational for each voter to sell his vote for any price above zero, otherwise he will
be left with a worthless right. The vote-buyer can therefore attain control over the institution by
paying trivial prices.20 In vote-trading in international institutions the conditions are different. The
number of voters in international institutions is not as large as in electorates or public
corporations. Consequently, the relative value of each vote and the benefit from making informed
decisions are larger.
Pressure to tender the vote in international institutions arises from an express or implicit threat
that the putative vote-seller will be worse off if it does not sell the vote or sells it too late. A useful
analogy is coercive tendering in corporate takeovers. It is known that when a tender offer is
accompanied by an express or implicit threat either not to buy the shares at all or to buy at a lower
price in the future, shareholders may tender their shares even when they believe that the offer price
is less than the fair value of their shares. In these circumstances, shareholders are faced with a
19
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choice: to accept the price at the front-end, or retain a less valuable minority stake when the
takeover has been consummated. Many shareholders attach a significant probability to the
likelihood that other shareholders (faced with the same threat) will tender their shares and the
takeover will succeed. Thus, it is rational for them to sell immediately even if they value their
share above the offer price.21
Coercive tendering in international institutions operates in a similar way. As described below in
the case of the WTO, there is evidence that powerful countries may use coercive tactics when
buying votes in order to effect decisions that benefit themselves potentially at the expense of other
(although not necessarily all) members of the relevant institution. Typically, the putative votebuyer offers certain inducements to countries, presumably those that object to its position on the
vote, in consideration for their agreement to vote in favor of its position. In addition, it makes
certain threats, for example, that bilateral aid will be withdrawn if a country does not vote as
requested. The presence of inducements and threats is likely to make countries attach a positive
probability to the possibility that many other countries will agree to the vote-buyer's proposal and
that the vote-buyer will win the vote. Therefore, it is rational for voters to sell their votes even if
the offer price is unfair.
In one main respect, however, coercive tendering in international institutions differs from
coercive tendering in corporate takeovers. The distinction between the front-end and the back-end
in the international context is not as clear-cut as in the corporate context, being mainly one of
degree. Whenever a vote-buyer manages to buy a vote its chances of attaining the required
majority increase. If other voters know that the vote-buyer is gradually accumulating votes, the
belief that the vote-buyer will achieve the required majority increases as well. Presumably, every
time a vote-buyer acquires a vote other countries increasingly fear that the vote-buyer will achieve
the necessary majority without buying their vote, and the pressure to sell for a lower price
increases. Thus we would expect the payment that each voter is offered for its vote to gradually
diminish as the vote-buyer continues to accumulate votes, whereas in the corporate context, due to
regulation, all shareholders are entitled to the best price offered to any of them during the tender
period.22
(2) Collective action problems: If voters are able to act collectively and coordinate their
positions vis-à-vis the vote-buyer - even when faced with pressure to sell - they may negotiate for
a price that reflects the fair collective value of their votes.23 If voters are unable to coordinate their
positions, they are likely to form the belief that other voters will sell their votes, and therefore it is
rational for them to do the same.
The feasibility of collective action depends on several factors. Two potential factors are the size
of the institution and the voting majority. In electorates or corporations with many shareholders,
the transaction costs of collective action are very high and often preclusive. In international
institutions, though, where the number of voters is smaller, the transaction costs of forming
coalitions are not particularly high. Collective action is therefore feasible even in the largest
international institutions. Regarding the second factor, the larger the majority required to pass a
21
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decision, the smaller the collective action problem because voting-trading has to benefit more
voters to affect voting outcomes.24 Under a unanimity rule, consensus or a veto system, there is in
principle no collective action problem, because one or several voters have the right to block
unfavorable outcomes. However, exercising a veto power or blocking decisions is likely to be
costly to small developing countries that exercise such rights, and the pressure to conform to
stronger countries' dictates may be significant. Thus, developing countries may face collective
action problems even where they possess a formal power to block adverse decisions. Accordingly,
size and voting majority are not significant factors.
There are two other key factors in the international context that affect collective action. First,
the stability of a bloc or a coalition depends on whether or not countries within the bloc have
similar interests. Countries in a coalition often seek to achieve different policies. Each member of
the coalition has an interest in only some of the policies that the coalition agrees to support.
Coalition members may also be amenable to different types of inducements or threats. Some
countries can be bought by certain threats because of their dependency on aid, while others may be
more interested in a bilateral free trade agreement. There will always be some uncertainty among
coalition members as to which inducements or threats the vote-buyer has offered to other coalition
members, and whether such inducements or threats will be sufficient to induce those countries to
defect from the coalition. This can increase countries' fear that other countries will defect from the
coalition, in which case they should do the same. Accordingly, the more divergent the interests of
coalition members, the more difficult it is for them to act collectively and the easier it is for votebuyers to induce them to leave the coalition.
A second critical factor in countries' ability to act together is the relative costs of exit for the
vote-buyer as compared to the costs of exit for the vote-sellers. Exiting the institution can take the
form of either withdrawing membership or taking action (short of direct coercion) that would have
the effect of undermining the institution's effectiveness or influence. For example, instead of
reaching an agreement within the WTO, the putative vote-buyer can enter into bilateral trade
negotiations. Exit options make it difficult for vote-sellers to act collectively when the costs of exit
for putative vote-buyers, normally the superpowers, are less than the costs of exit for putative
vote-sellers, normally developing countries. The costs of exit are higher for developing countries
than for developed ones when the former are dependent on the relevant institution’s decisions or
because the institution itself is dependent on the participation and support of powerful votebuyers. In these circumstances, there is an implicit threat that vote-buyers will exit the institution
if they cannot obtain favorable decisions. If powerful vote-buyers decide to exit the institution, the
costs are borne primarily by other less powerful countries.
(3) Competition: Competition among vote-buyers for votes can drive up the prices of votes to
a level that reflects their fair value.25 Competition would require vote-buyers to offer prices that
are closer to the fair value of the votes in order to win the vote. Competition for votes in
international institutions is constrained by the fact that many developing countries are too poor to
buy votes. There will often be only one vote-buyer or one group of vote-buyers that buys votes for
a specific policy, especially if developed countries adopt the same stance and seek to buy the votes
of many developing countries with conflicting interests. Competition may develop, though, where
24

I note, though, that a qualified majority rule can also make it easier for putative vote-buyers to prevent unfavorable
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Levmore, supra note 12, at 135-139.
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the superpowers have opposing views and compete with each other for other countries' votes.
ii) Is coercive tendering undesirable?
Whether or not coercive tendering is inefficient and/or unfair depends on the price that vote-sellers
receive for their votes. Coercive tendering will tend to be inefficient and unfair when this price is
below the fair value of the vote. Voter-sellers suffer because they are transferring their rights for
less than their worth. Other voters whose votes were not necessary to pass the decision suffer
because they lose the vote. However, coercive tendering will be inefficient only if the costs to such
voters outweigh the benefits to the vote-buyers and other countries that incidentally benefit from
the decision facilitated by the vote-trading. Where the coercive tendering is directed by one or few
wealthy vote-buyers towards many poorer countries, it may be reasonable to conclude that the
costs to poor nations outweigh the benefits to vote-buyers. Nonetheless, even if coercive tendering
cannot unequivocally be found to be inefficient, it can be objectionable on distributional grounds.
When the prices of votes are unfair, coercive tendering has the effect of distributing resources
from poor countries to wealthy vote-buyers. Such undesirable distributional consequences can in
themselves provide good grounds for restraining vote-trading.
On the other hand, coercive tendering can be efficient and distributionally fair. Putative votesellers will not necessarily demand a price that reflects the fair value of their votes, but may seek
to obtain higher prices. Countries may hold out for excessive prices, especially if their consent is
required to effect a decision. Such holdouts are inefficient because they can delay or prevent
welfare-maximizing decisions. It would be efficient if the holdout countries were pressured into
accepting a fair offer for their votes by using a strategy of coercive tendering. Vote-buyers can use
inducements and threats to create the belief in the holdout voters that a certain decision is
imminent and therefore holding out would not be an effective strategy. The effect of such coercive
tendering would be to split the holdout coalition by reducing the prices of votes to their fair value,
and thereby facilitate efficient decisions.
Accordingly, we need to distinguish between cases where the coercive tendering imposes costs
on vote-sellers and cases where coercive tendering constrains holdouts. This ultimately depends
on whether the price vote-sellers receive for their vote is fair or excessive. This distinction raises a
methodological problem. The assessment of the fairness of the price of a vote depends on a
comparison of the value that countries would sincerely attach to the benefits that would accrue to
them from favorable decisions as compared to the value of specific side-payments. For such a
comparison to be accurate we need to monetize the values of decisions and side-payments (that
often will be non-monetary). There is no scientific or systematic method to monetize these values,
and the comparison will inevitably be based on political, social and economic opinions of what the
vote-sellers have gained or lost in the decision-making process. Such opinions will often be widely
divergent, and therefore the effects of coercive tendering can be subject to conflicting views.
(b) Judgment-decisions:
Coercive tendering practices can in principle take place in judgment-decisions as well, though
their effect will be different. Under the circumstances explained above, it can be rational for votesellers to sell their votes if they believe that a certain judgment-decision will be adopted even if
they vote against it. The effect of coercive tendering would be to make it easier and cheaper for
the vote-buyer to pass decisions. But, even if coercive tendering plays some part in facilitating a
11

judgment-decision, the key policy issue remains the effect of that decision on the collective good,
irrespective of whether or not it is easy or difficult for the vote-buyer to purchase votes and of the
price transferred from the vote-buyer to the vote-sellers.26 It is also noteworthy that with the
possible exception of one seemingly isolated case,27 it is very difficult to find cases where coercive
tendering facilitates bad-decisions, and as the cases discussed below suggest, vote-buyers usually
pay valuable consideration for votes on judgment-decisions.28 Accordingly, I do not discuss
coercive tendering in judgment-decisions.
3. Agency Costs (Constituents)
(a) Preference-decisions:
In preference-decisions, the question is whether the vote-trading leads governments to accept
decisions that reduce or increase the wellbeing of their constituents. A government can enter both
vote-buying and logrolling deals in order to maximize the benefits of its constituents, either by
gaining a vote on a policy that would benefit them or by receiving a valuable payment for the vote
that the government utilizes for their benefit.
The potential problem is that vote-trading can give a special incentive for governments to
pursue their own interests by selling votes instead of exercising those votes in the interests of their
constituents. A government can agree to a decision that harms the interests of its constituents in
return for a cash payment that it can utilize for its own benefit. However, similar to agency costs
(collective good) in judgment-decisions, agency costs are already inherent in many preferencedecisions because governments, especially in countries with weak accountability mechanisms,
may also use voting rights to maximize their own interests at the expense of their constituents'
interests. The question, then, is whether vote-trading exacerbates such agency costs. Agency costs
are exacerbated when but for the vote-trading a country would vote for a decision that better
maximizes the interests of its constituents than the overall outcome (including the decision
obtained and the payment received) facilitated by the vote-trading. Vote-trading will have this
effect when the option of selling the vote gave the government the incentive and option to sacrifice
its constituent’s interests in order to further its own. This risk is particularly pertinent in votebuying deals and external-logrolling, where the consideration is a vote on an IMF or World Bank
loan. In such transactions the consideration for the vote is a financial benefit that the government
can disburse among the governing elite.29 Payments made to a small ruling elite are also likely to
be cheaper for vote-buyers than votes on major policy decisions.
On the other hand, vote-trading can actually ameliorate agency costs, where but for the votetrading the government would have voted for a policy that maximizes its own narrow interests, or
26
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the interests of an affiliated elite, at the expense of the interests of its constituents as a whole. The
consideration for the vote can give incentives to the government to vote for a policy that better
maximizes the interests of its constituents. The government of the vote-buyer is interested in
maximizing the interests of its own constituents, but the policies it pursues incidentally benefit the
constituents of the vote-seller as well. Thus vote-trading mitigates agency costs when a
government pays another government to vote for a policy that maximizes the welfare of the
constituents of both governments, even if the government buying the votes is probably not
interested in the wellbeing of the constituents of the government selling the votes.
As in the other contexts discussed above, the analysis of agency costs is subject to
methodological difficulties. First, the analysis requires an evaluation of which decisions would
best maximize the interests of vote-sellers' constituents. Whether or not the decisions of
international institutions benefit the people of vote-sellers can be subject to divergent opinions.
Second, estimating governments' actions and their effects on their constituents if not for the votetrading inevitably involves some speculation and uncertainty. Third, when a decision facilitated by
vote-trading is not in the interests of vote-sellers' constituents, we need to examine whether the
price for the votes adequately compensated these vote-sellers' constituents. Given there is no
precise way of quantifying the values of specific policies or side-payments to specific constituents,
it is very difficult to compare the value of votes to the value of side-payments. It is also extremely
difficult to collate evidence on whether vote-sellers use the consideration for their votes for the
benefit of their constituents or for the benefit of the governing elites.
(b) Judgment-decisions:
In judgment-decisions, by definition, there is no risk of agency costs (constituents) because
governments are not expected to maximize the interests of their constituents, but only the interests
of the international community.
3. Application of the Analytical Framework to Specific Case-Studies
In this part I apply the analytical framework to vote-trading in four institutions: the SC, the GA,
the WTO and the IWC. Each of the following sections discusses a different institution, first by
describing reported cases of vote-trading, second by classifying the decisions of each institution as
judgment-decisions or preference-decisions, and third by analyzing the effects of vote-trading in
the relevant institution by reference to the reported cases. The analysis of the effects of votetrading examines the applicable contexts in which certain benefits and costs may arise. In
judgment-decisions, I discuss agency costs (collective good). In preference-decisions, I discuss
coercive tendering and agency costs (constituents).
Before embarking on the analysis, one caveat should be made. Although there is ample
evidence of vote-trading, the extent of the phenomenon is not entirely clear. It is possible that
there are other unreported cases of vote-trading, and therefore the sample of cases is subject to a
selection bias. Other borderline practices are difficult to categorize as vote-trading. For example,
we do not know precisely to what extent countries shape their voting in accordance with potential
threats of withholding certain benefits by other countries, and it may be difficult to verify the
causal connection between vote-trading agreements and the outcome of votes. For the sake of
simplicity, however, I limit the discussion to reported cases, bearing in mind that the evidence
may be partial and requires careful evaluation.
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A. The Security Council
1. Reported Cases of Vote-Trading
There is both specific and statistical evidence of vote-trading in the SC.30 The discussion in this
section focuses on specific cases in order to identify the effects of vote-trading on specific
decisions. The first case concerns Resolution 678, which authorized the deployment of armed
forces against Iraq in the First Gulf War in 1991.31 In exchange for support for the resolution or
abstention, the US made the following promises: a promise of financial aid to Colombia, Cote
d’Ivoire, Ethiopia and Zaire; a promise to the USSR to keep Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania out of
the November 1990 Paris Summit conference and to persuade Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to provide
it with hard currency to make overdue payments to its commercial creditors; a promise to China to
lift trade sanctions in place since the Tienanmen Square massacre of pro-democracy protesters and
to provide support for a World Bank loan of $114.3 million, and the resumption of normal
diplomatic intercourse between the two countries. By contrast, the US cut off its $70 million
annual aid to Yemen because of its opposition to the resolution.32
In the prelude to the Second Gulf War, the US had less success in its vote-trading attempts. One
report suggests that US aid, financial assistance and leverage played a role in securing Resolution
1441,33 which called on Iraq to disarm from its weapons of mass destruction and set up an
enhanced inspection regime to supervise the disarmament.34 The main story, though, concerns the
US failure to pass a resolution authorizing the use of armed force. There is evidence that
throughout the negotiations the US attempted to buy the votes of non-permanent members – either
by promising rewards or by hints of punishment.35 The main targets of US solicitation were
countries that had not decided how to vote, namely: Angola, Guinea, Cameroon, Pakistan, Chile
and Mexico. Despite the leverage of the US over these countries and the economic inducements
offered (especially, better trade terms and foreign aid),36 they maintained their objection to the
resolution.
Likewise, Malone tells the story of Resolution 94037 on the restoration of the democratically
elected government in Haiti and the ousting of the military regime.38 The US and France were
30
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interested in military intervention. Russia and China objected. China has generally been averse to
policies that infringe on state sovereignty, including peacekeeping missions.39 Russia has
generally adopted an anti-Western foreign policy, under which it tends to object to US-led
operations and seeks to weaken SC intervention.40 There are very strong indications that the US
promised Russia to support Resolution 937 concerning the UN peacekeeping operations in
Georgia, which gave formal status to Russia's peacekeeping force in Georgia, the CIS.41 The US
facilitated World Bank loans to China by abstaining in the vote on those loans and also gave China
security guarantees related to various concessions in relation to Taiwan. In return, Russia and
China withdrew their opposition to the resolution and abstained.
2. Category of Decision
SC decisions are judgment-decisions. Countries are expected to vote with a view to maximizing
the collective good rather than their own preferences. Article 24(1) of the UN Charter states that
the members of the UN '...confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.' Moreover, Article 24(2) requires the SC to
act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN. These purposes include maintaining
international peace and security and promoting respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms. The SC is thus a form of public trust, under which SC members are entrusted with
certain defined powers that they are required to exercise for the benefit of the international
community. It is arguable that countries can take into account their interests to some extent. That
the permanent five members ('P-5') have a veto power may suggest that they are entitled to use
their voting powers to maximize their own interests. It can also be argued that because the SC
seats are distributed geographically among regions,42 each country can at least take into account
the interests of the group it “represents”. However, the better view is that countries' duty is
towards the international community at large. The veto powers are designed to ensure that the SC
does not usurp its powers, and there is nothing in the UN Charter to suggest that they override the
SC's duties to maximize the collective good. Likewise, the geographical distribution of seats is
intended to ensure that differing regions and cultures have a say in determining the collective
good, rather than to legitimize countries' pursuit of their own interests.
3. Analysis of Vote-Trading
The question is whether or not the SC resolutions obtained via vote-trading are good-decisions or
bad-decisions. The SC mandate and the purposes of the UN Charter serve as the initial guide to
defining the collective good. The problem with identifying the SC mandate and the purposes of
the UN Charter is that they have been subject to differing interpretations, especially in the context
of the use of armed force. While the UN Charter conditions the SC's authorization of the use of
armed force on the existence of a threat to international peace and security, the Charter has been
interpreted expansively to allow the use of force in cases with a relatively weak international
dimension, including: grave human rights violations and, more controversially, disruption of
39
40
41
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democracy.43 Accordingly, in considering decisions' effects on the collective good, we also need
to take account of the general consequences of each resolution, countries' reactions to each
resolution, and empirical evaluation of public opinion.
The SC resolutions that concern Iraq seem to have had generally wide support. The Iraqi
occupation of Kuwait clearly constituted a threat to international peace and security. The
resolution facilitated the freeing of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, the use of force enjoyed a
worldwide consensus, and most countries and people considered the action to be commendable.44
Resolution 1441 was not controversial because it did not involve substantial sanctions on Iraq or
the use of force. By contrast, before the Second Gulf War, when there was worldwide public
opinion against military action,45 vote-trading attempts failed to facilitate the SC’s authorization. It
is also noteworthy that alleged US threats before the Second Gulf War, unlike in the case of
Yemen in the First Gulf War, do not appear to have materialized 46
The operations in Haiti may appear more controversial because they involved the US using its
military under the UN auspices within its own hemisphere. The US had a direct interest in
preventing the flow of Haitian refugees from arriving in the US. Moreover, although the text of the
resolution justified the intervention mainly on the basis of the humanitarian situation, the crisis
was largely a domestic affair and the operations were aimed at changing the regime. Nonetheless,
it appears that overall the effect of the resolution was, at least on balance, beneficial. The
operations succeeded in ending the military regime responsible for grave human rights violations
and facilitated the restoration of democracy. Despite initial reservations, especially by South
American countries, the international reaction to the actions was generally positive and the people
of Haiti welcomed the intervention.47
Similar concerns arise in relation to Resolution 937. Russia had a direct individual interest in
increasing its influence within its hemisphere and was implicitly supporting the Abkhaz that
resisted Georgian sovereignty. Despite these concerns, the cooperation of the Russian CIS forces
with the UN forces in Georgia appears to have helped in maintaining stability. The costs, if any, to
people in Georgia who resisted Russia’s intervention were probably inevitable given that Russia
was already involved in the area. Moreover, the subjection of Russia to some UN supervision
actually ameliorated these costs and promoted international norms, albeit imperfectly.48
Accordingly, it appears that the results of vote-trading were generally positive. But, in order to
assess the effects of vote-trading we further need to compare these results with the likely outcomes
but for the vote-trading. One option is that the crises in Iraq and Haiti would have been left
without a remedy. In light of the positive effects of the resolutions, no action would clearly be an
43
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inferior result. Another option is that of unilateral intervention without SC approval. The US's
unilateral interventions both in Panama in 1989 and in Iraq in 2003 suggest that if Resolutions 648
and 940 had not been adopted the US would have intervened unilaterally both in Iraq in 1991 and
in Haiti in 1994. Similarly, there is little doubt that Russia would have intervened in Georgia,
given that Resolution 937 was essentially an ex post recognition of the CIS operations.
Accordingly, it seems that the main effect of vote-trading on the basis of the above reported cases
is to facilitate collective action in circumstances that merit intervention, where the vote-buyer
would otherwise pursue unilateral action.
An exhaustive comparison of the merits of collective action versus unilateral action is outside
the scope of this paper, but there are reasons to argue that collective action is preferable.
Collective action promotes accountability of the relevant operation to the UN and subjects it to
more stringent norms. Resolutions 678 and 937 included reporting requirements to the SC, and
Resolutions 937 and 940 deployed UN observers to monitor the activities of national forces. While
these accountability measures have not been optimal or sufficient,49 accountability has been better
than in unilateral interventions. Additionally, there is some scope for arguing that collective action
is more effective than unilateral action in remedying threats to international peace and security.
The US-led operations in Panama and Iraq in 2003 were significantly less successful than the
interventions in Haiti and Iraq in 1991.50 There is also evidence that countries and the global
public tend to support multilateral operations and oppose unilateral ones.51
In summary, there are several reasons to believe that vote-trading in the SC generates gooddecisions by facilitating collective action under the UN auspices. On this view, the US acts as a
'benevolent vote-buyer' that buys the votes of countries that would otherwise cast their votes for
outcomes that would fail to maximize collective welfare. Countries such as China and Russia have
traditionally objected to international intervention in countries’ affairs.52 These countries can block
good-decisions relatively easily by exercising their veto power to maximize their interests against
international intervention. Similarly, the logrolling between the US and Russia involving
Resolutions 940 and 937 may be categorized as an efficient logrolling compromise. In order to
make way for two decisions that would promote the collective good, i.e. the subjection of regional
forces to UN supervision, Russia and the US agreed to concede their individual interests in having
unrestricted freedom of action within their respective regions. Each country conditioned its
agreement to UN supervision within its region on the other agreeing to the same
Moreover, the consequences of vote-trading, especially in relation to Iraq, suggest that it is
unlikely that vote-trading would enable SC members to pass resolutions that are plainly offensive
to the collective good. Two main factors lie behind this assertion. The primary factor is countries'
preferences. The vote-buyer, normally the US, tends to have good-preferences supported by both
altruism and self-interest. While the US is unlikely to buy votes if its interests are not at stake, it is
49
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concerned with promoting peace, security and human rights and will normally justify its actions
by reference to these objectives. In addition, the US's interests are often congruent with policies
that maximize the collective good. For example, the US had individual interests in releasing
Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation. Moreover, the preferences of vote-sellers seem to operate as a
constraint on the vote-buyer's ability to buy votes for bad-decisions. While many small countries
often form bad-preferences or have little interest in SC decisions, altruism may become an
important factor, especially when one vote-buyer seeks to execute a bad-decision for its own
benefit. Where concern for the collective good militates heavily against voting with the US, the
price countries attach to their vote is high. In the Second Gulf War, poor countries, such as Guinea
and Cameroon, did not respond to US solicitations. In fact, countries seemingly refused to support
the resolution partly because they perceived the action as essentially serving American interests at
the expense of the collective good. Likewise, many countries have an individual interest in curbing
the US’s ability to pursue SC resolutions, especially when the US pursues bad-decisions. Many
countries had direct or indirect individual interests - including economic, political and ideological
interests - against the use of force in Iraq in 2003.53
The second factor is information on vote-trading deals. It seems that widespread international
public opinion and reputational costs can reduce the likelihood of bad-decisions facilitated by
vote-trading. Before the Second Gulf War, there were ample, albeit sporadic, critical reports on the
inducements and pressures employed by the US to reach a resolution. It is likely that public
opinion objecting to the war put some pressure on countries or made it easier for them to resist the
threats and inducements to vote with the US. Additionally, it is possible that at least partly because
of the consensus on the need to free Kuwait, there was less criticism of the vote-trading before the
First Gulf War, and the reputational costs to vote-traders were therefore much less significant.
B. The General Assembly
1. Reported Cases of Vote-Trading
The effect of vote-trading in the GA seems to vary with the type and importance of the decision at
stake. The GA has the power to make nonbinding decisions, such as recommendations on issues
relating to international peace and security, and certain binding decisions. With regard to
nonbinding decisions, there is statistical evidence that aid and multilateral loans can buy votes in
the GA.54 The effect of such vote-trading on global welfare, however, is probably limited because
of the nonbinding nature of the resolutions and their relative ineffectiveness in regulating states’
behavior.55 The discussion therefore focuses on binding decisions, where the effect of vote-trading
is potentially stronger and there is more specific evidence of vote-trading deals. I focus on election
53
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decisions in the GA, where vote-trading among countries is consistently the norm.
The evidence relates in particular to election of nonpermanent members of the SC and election
of judges to the ICJ.56 Malone describes the ample trade of votes among states in elections to the
SC, and provides valuable insights on this practice.57 First, countries often trade votes for votes in
elections to other organizations. Because of the SC’s importance, votes in elections to the SC are
usually exchanged for several votes in other elections. The votes of certain countries are worth
more than the votes of others because of their active or passive influence over other countries’
votes. Second, there is also evidence of vote-buying. Most commonly, there are allegations of aid
being conditioned on votes and financial favors provided to officials of other countries. For
example, the election of Japan in 1996 by a large majority was allegedly facilitated by its aid
program and favors to officials.58 Third, vote-trading involves virtually all countries. Malone
claims that the P-5 do not trade openly but there may be exchanges of votes for ‘badly needed
favors’ or in recognition of diplomatic friendship. However, it appears that when the US has
strong views on the elections, it uses its full leverage (including vote-trading) to influence votes.
Thus there are reports that the US intervened to prevent the election of Sudan to the SC in 2000,59
and more recently the election of Venezuela.60 It is noteworthy, though, that small countries
(including Sudan and Venezuela) buy votes as well, especially by paying directly to delegates.
Fourth, the strongest country does not necessarily win. Less powerful members can court small
countries and win the elections. Every vote counts and elections can be decided by a small number
of votes.
As in elections to the SC, there is strong, albeit general, evidence of vote-trading among
countries in elections to the ICJ. Government representatives, candidates and even judges report
that vote-trading rather than impartial evaluation of qualifications is an important determinant of
international judicial elections.61 Most commonly, states engage in logrolling. States agree to
support the candidate of another state in return for support for their own candidates, often in
elections to other positions in international institutions. As stated by Rosenne: ‘…there is little
doubt that at times a delegation is instructed to vote for a given candidate in return for promises of
56
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support on another matter of close concern to it, whether its own candidature in another election or
a matter of substantive concern.’62
2. Category of Decision
Elections to the SC and the ICJ are judgment-decisions. Article 23(1) of the UN Charter expressly
requires that in elections to the SC due regard be paid primarily to the contribution of countries to
the maintenance of peace and security and the purposes of the UN Charter. Countries are expected
to elect members with the greatest commitment to international peace and security. Likewise,
Article 2 of the Statute of the ICJ states: ‘The Court shall be composed of a body of independent
judges, elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who
possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest
judicial offices, or are juriconsults of recognized competence in international law.’ Countries are
required to choose the judges with the highest qualifications and moral integrity. It is noteworthy
in this respect that both in the SC and the ICJ, seats are distributed among specific regions.63 This
arguably suggests that countries should elect the candidates that would best represent their
interests or the interests of their region. The prevailing view, however, is that the most qualified
candidates should be elected, and that geographical distribution is a secondary consideration both
in SC elections64 and ICJ elections.65
3. Analysis of Vote-Trading
Whether vote-trading facilitates bad-decisions or good-decisions depends on whether vote-trading
leads to the election of more qualified or less qualified candidates than those that would be elected
but for the vote-trading.
The first place to start is to ask whether the quality of elected candidates is satisfactory. In the
case of the SC, as Malone argues, not infrequently countries with weak reputations for promoting
international peace win election to the SC at the expense of countries that have consistently
displayed a commitment to such ideals. The election of Syria to the SC in 2001, a country alleged
to be involved in sponsoring terror organizations, is one obvious example. Apart from legitimate
reasons, such as gaining international prestige or pursuing broader objectives, countries seek a SC
seat in order to advance their positions when the SC considers decisions that affect their
interests.66 Another reason may even be to attract financial aid from other countries that seek to
buy their votes.67 In the case of the ICJ, the picture is more equivocal. On the one hand, some take
the view that the professional qualifications of ICJ judges are very high.68 Nomination procedures
in many countries are usually designed to provide some assurance that ICJ judges are duly
qualified.69 On the other hand, others take a different view. Reisman has argued that UN election
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systems sometimes produce 'undistinguished candidates or mediocrities.'70 There is even a claim
concerning judicial misconduct to favor specific parties.71 A recent study provides empirical
evidence that decisions of individual judges are biased, first in favor of their country of origin, but
also to varying extents in favor of countries that match the economic, political and cultural
attributes of their own.72 There is a suspicion that candidates may be expected to maintain loyalty
to their countries’ interests.
But even if the quality of elected candidates is unsatisfactory, we still need to establish that
vote-trading materially contributes to this result. Malone's account seems to suggest that votetrading is one among several elements in the election process that weakens the requirement that
SC members show commitment to international peace and security. In the context of ICJ elections,
Gross argued that certain qualified candidates were not elected because their countries did not
belong to any vote-trading bloc in the UN,73 and the practice of vote-trading has been heavily
criticized by NGOs as reducing the quality of elections.74 On this view, without vote-trading,
countries would tend to elect better candidates. This view is plausible if we believe that countries
have good-preferences because of individual interests or altruistic preferences. Vote-buyers will
normally be countries that buy votes for their own candidacy or candidates. Such vote-buyers buy
votes of countries that would otherwise vote for other better candidates, and there is naturally a
chance that these vote-buyers will win.75 One example may be Japan's landslide win over India in
1996, despite Japan’s unimpressive record of participation in peace maintenance activities.76 It is
noteworthy that because voting is by secret ballot, there is little information on which counties
actually trade votes, and therefore countries do not suffer reputational costs for vote-trading that
facilitates bad-decisions.
On the other hand, a second opinion holds that vote-trading generates positive results. On this
view, the required majority often has bad-preferences, and there is a need for a benevolent votebuyer to buy votes to secure the election of better candidates. For example, in the case of elections
to the SC, the US used its leverage (including vote-trading) in order to prevent the election in 2000
of Sudan, a country accused of gross human rights violations, and, more recently, of Venezuela, a
country with a doubtful commitment to maintaining peace and security. In the case of elections to
the ICJ, there are no specific examples, but one account suggests that influential countries buy
votes to ensure the quality of elected judges. Rosenne argues that diplomatic contacts
(presumably, including vote-trading) prior to the elections enable influential governments to
indicate their views of candidates’ qualifications, and that such contacts help in ensuring that
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candidates measure up to the required standard.77
That vote-trading is beneficial is far from being the conclusive view. Vote-trading is also
utilized by unethical countries that aim to promote less qualified candidates. Poor countries can
afford the price of votes, given that countries often pay with votes in other international elections
and the payments are often directed towards individuals that can be bought more cheaply. Syria, a
country on the US's list of terrorism sponsors, was elected to the SC in 2001 despite the US's
strong opposition, although the extent to which either Syria or the US were involved in votetrading is unclear.78 Moreover, even where the US actively bought votes for good-decisions, it is
not clear what the result would have been if not for the vote-trading, because other countries also
buy votes. Both Sudan in 2000 and Venezuela in 2006 engaged in vote-trading as well, so
arguably they would have lost anyway if all countries avoided the practice of vote-trading.
In summary, it is difficult to conclude whether or not vote-trading leads to good-decisions or
bad-decisions, and in some cases it may have no effect on the outcome. More information about
specific vote-trading deals is necessary in order to assess their effect. The interesting question
remains whether but for the option of making individual gains countries would tend to vote for
more or less qualified candidates.
C. The World Trade Organization
1. Reported Cases of Vote-Trading
Vote-trading is the norm in WTO negotiations. The essence of the WTO decision-making process
involves vote-trading, in the sense that countries agree to support one policy in return for another
country's agreement to support another policy. Vote-trading can take place between two opposing
negotiating blocs. Vote-trading can also be intra-bloc. The essence of many coalitions within the
WTO is internal-logrolling agreements under which each country agrees to support a list of
negotiating objectives, only some of which are of interest to it.
More controversially, there is evidence of vote-trading coupled with coercive tactics employed
by developed countries, especially the US and EC countries. Such practices take place in informal
meetings before and during WTO ministerial conferences and they are aimed at breaking down
coalitions of developing countries. The main focus of such attempts in the Doha Round in 2001
was the Like Minded Group (LMG), a group of 14 developing countries, which sought to promote
implementation issues, development issues and procedural reform, and objected to negotiations
over the Singapore issues.79 Jawara & Kwa and Narlikar & Odell provide many examples of
carrots, sticks and logrolling allegedly used to induce countries to defect from the LMG.80 Threats
included withholding preferential trade agreements and concessions and blocking the availability
of IMF loans. More concrete side-payments included the following: The US granted South Africa
$9 million in technical assistance and $9.2 million assistance under AGOA; Tanzania was granted
$3 billion in debt relief under the HIPC initiative and the ACP waiver; Jamaica received an aid
77
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package from the IMF and the ACP waiver; Kenya received the ACP waiver and technical
assistance; Japan signed a bilateral investment agreement with Indonesia on condition that
Indonesia endorse the talks about investment in Doha. Other countries received trivial promises:
Malaysia received unenforceable promises regarding non-agricultural market access; Mauritius
got an unbinding promise of a study program specific to small and vulnerable countries. The LMG
eventually fragmented without achieving its objectives. Its members agreed to negotiate over the
Singapore issues in future rounds in return for a general commitment to development issues.
The ministerial in Cancun took a different turn. A new group, the G-20, emerged, led by Brazil,
China and India. The G-20 demanded that developed countries undertake nonreciprocal measures
to eliminate trade restrictions, including radical cuts in domestic support measures provided by
developed countries, duty-free access for tropical and other agricultural products, and the
elimination of export subsidies for certain products. The G-20 strongly resisted the joint US and
EC agricultural policy and the Singapore issues. As in Doha, developed countries tried to split the
G-20. The US, for example, offered inducements in the form of tariff quotas to certain Central
American countries and threatened to slow down regional integration. But the G-20 held together
firmly in Cancun, and no agreements were concluded.81
Specific evidence of vote-buying or external-logrolling in the ministerial in Hong Kong in 2005
is scarce, although there are reports of 'divide and conquer' tactics employed by developed
countries (possibly, including vote-trading) in order to split the G-20.82 The end result appears to
have been decided in closed-door negotiations between the US and the EC, on one side, and Brazil
and India, on the other. Although some members, such as South Africa and Venezuela, expressed
their opposition to it, all countries voted for a common deal, which included the following: in
agriculture, a commitment to eliminate export subsidies by 2013, and a three-tier approach to
reducing domestic subsidies; a commitment to ensure market access in services within four bands;
reduction of tariffs on NAMA would be conducted in accordance with the Swiss Formula; and aid
in the form of IMF and World Banks loans would be provided to developing countries.83
2. Category of Decision
The decisions of the WTO, which concern trade rules, are preference-decisions. Countries are
expected to pursue their individual interests in order to effect welfare-maximizing decisions for
the benefit of their own constituents, irrespective of their effect on other countries and the
international community. It has been argued that WTO decisions should be based on principles of
equity and fairness,84 in the sense that countries should take into account the interests of other especially poor - countries and the international community. The development agenda of the WTO
suggests that WTO negotiations should address the distributional concerns of poor countries.85
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Nonetheless, in its current form the WTO decision-making process does not allow for
distributional concerns to be addressed other than via the negotiations process.86 Developing
countries are thus required to make reciprocal concessions for any benefit provided by developed
countries, and developed countries have no obligation to make unilateral concessions in favor of
poorer countries.
3. Analysis of Vote-Trading
In preference-decisions, vote-trading is prima facie efficient. Vote-trading, especially internallogrolling, is necessary for the effectiveness of the WTO decision-making process, which
'...inevitably involves quid pro quo and sometimes tit-for-tat.’87 The WTO voting system is based
on consensus and each country has, at least formally, a veto power.88 It would be virtually
impossible to reach decisions by consensus without reciprocal tradeoffs. These tradeoffs are
essentially based on internal-logrolling agreements, under which countries exchange their
positions over different trade policies. Vote-buying and external-logrolling can also facilitate
consensus. One example is where two opposing coalitions cannot reach an agreement, but wish to
break the deadlock by making payments other than trade concessions. Similarly, where a
developed countries’ coalition reaches agreements over trade rules with the larger developing
countries, leaving smaller countries little to gain, for example, because they have no exports of the
relevant products, it may be efficient to allow side-payments to these smaller countries in order to
facilitate consensus. The concern, however, is the extent to which vote-trading may involve
inefficient coercive tendering and exacerbate agency costs (constituents).
(a) Coercive Tendering:
I first discuss the elements of coercive tendering, and then consider whether or not such coercive
tendering is undesirable.
i) Elements of coercive tendering:
(1) Pressure to tender: That there is a pressure to tender in the WTO is clearly indicated by
the presence of inducements and threats. Developing countries often labor under the fear that they
will end up losing in the negotiation process. Therefore, it may be rational for them to accept sidepayments even if less valuable than the concessions they demanded in the negotiations.
(2) Collective action problems: The ability of developing countries to bargain for better
outcomes depends on collective action. While each country in the WTO formally has a veto power
to stop trade deals and demand better value for its vote, the realities of power politics in the WTO
are different. A draft of packaged agreements is usually agreed on in informal meetings, often
without the participation of the smaller developing countries. The draft is presented at a formal
meeting and is usually accepted with only minor amendments. When one country opposes such a
packaged deal, it is likely to come under pressure from other countries. Particularly small
developing countries may be unable to actively object to other countries’ dictates because such
needs of their economic development...'.
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objection may be followed by a sanction, such as the withdrawal of aid.89
Two main factors need to be examined to assess developing countries' ability to act
collectively: the heterogeneity of coalition members' interests and the relative costs of exit for
vote-buyers. First, the interests of members of developing countries' coalitions are not only not
homogeneous, but often conflicting as well. Brazil and Argentina seek agricultural liberalization,
whereas India has a protectionist policy on market access.90 The smaller developing countries are
focused on development and capacity issues, but even their interests are divergent and depend on
their specific comparative advantages.91 As explained above, the differences in interests of
developing countries make their coalitions less stable and more vulnerable to inducements and
threats. The experience of trade coalitions in the WTO as well as the GATT indicates that without
internal coherence and shared commercial interests, a coalition is unlikely to succeed, especially
when the US and EC stand together.92 Second, the costs of exit for developed countries are
significantly lesser than the costs of exit for developing countries. The US and EC are less
dependent on the benefits of multilateral agreements than developing countries because the costs
of losing a volume of exports are less likely to have a substantial effect on their economies.93 In
addition, the US and the EC can always seek bilateral or regional trade agreements because there
are always countries that would like to have more access to their markets. Developing countries
also have less bargaining leverage when negotiating bilaterally with the powerful countries, and
they are likely to gain less in bilateral deals than in multilateral deals.94
The relatively low costs of exit for developed countries and the conflicting interests of
developing countries create collective action problems, and together with the pressure on
developing countries to tender their votes create the perception in developing countries that their
demands will not be met in the negotiations. When countries begin to defect from a coalition by
selling their votes, the coalition loses its credibility and ability to block adverse decisions, and
other countries, fearful of being left with no gains, are likely to follow suit.95 The collapse of the
LMG in Doha and, to some extent, the G-20 in Hong Kong points to this pattern. The more
countries defected from the LMG, the more the coalition's value diminished, which in turn
prompted more defections, until India remained alone with no realistic power to object to the final
agreement.96 The G-20 has shown resilience in Cancun, but the result of Hong Kong suggests that
deals can be concluded largely by appeasing the larger members of the G-20, Brazil and India, and
leaving other countries dissatisfied. While such deals between developed countries and the larger
developing countries are not always feasible, there are reasons to question whether developing
countries would be consistently capable of acting collectively against coercive tendering practices.
(3) Competition: The main parties that buy votes, other than via internal-logrolling, are the US
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and the EC, and both tend to agree on a common position either before or during ministerial
conferences. Developing countries, even the large ones, do not offer similar inducements to other
developing countries to prevent defections from their coalitions, simply because they cannot
afford to make side-payments.97 Accordingly, there is no meaningful competition among votebuyers in the WTO.
ii) Is coercive tendering undesirable?
Coercive tendering may be undesirable on the grounds of efficiency and unfair distribution, but
only if we can show that the inducements paid to specific countries and/or the value they have
extracted from WTO decisions are less than the fair value of their votes. Thus we need to assess
whether or not developing countries ended up losing from WTO packaged agreements.
Commentators' views on this issue are widely divergent.
There is a body of opinion that developing countries tend to concede more in WTO
negotiations than they receive. In relation to the Doha ministerial, it was argued that LMG
countries were worse off after the conference than before it.98 Perhaps the only meaningful gain to
the LMG, a general commitment to development issues and promises to bolster technical
assistance, was described as essentially verbal and did not mandate any operative effect.99 Similar
arguments have been made in the context of Hong Kong.100 On this view, the agricultural
concessions are minimal (especially the EC repackaged reforms that the EU was supposed to
undertake anyway); aid for trade is a weak commitment to development (and possibly repackaging
of IMF and World Bank loans as concessions); commitment to liberalization of services is harmful
to many developing countries, and so is the Swiss formula in respect of NAMA. However, even if
we adopt this view, we still need to show that the value of side-payments for agreeing to these
decisions did not adequately compensate the vote-sellers. Some of the payments reported above,
especially the nonbinding promises to impoverished countries, do seem to be negligible and
certain inducements offered to developing countries, such as the ACP waiver, were found later to
have limited value.101 On the other hand, it is not clear how to compare the side-payments given to
developing countries with the benefits they sincerely expected to obtain, especially as some
countries did not concede much in the negotiations anyway.102 Moreover, some countries did
receive a sizable aid package or a loan, and they have probably not lost in this process.
Accordingly, it is difficult to assess the extent to which developing countries as a group suffered
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from the overall outcomes, if at all.
The other view is that WTO ministerial conferences have generally yielded fair and efficient
results.103 On this view, developing countries were able to extract fair value for their votes in the
form of favorable decisions. Regarding the Doha ministerial, the commitment to development and
concessions on TRIPS in exchange for an agreement to speak on the Singapore issues in future
rounds has been viewed by many as a successful outcome. The US's and the EC's compromise on
agriculture in Hong Kong, albeit not optimal, is equivalent to developing countries' concessions on
services and NAMA. In this respect, the value of side-payments and threats exerted by developed
countries are of limited importance from a welfare perspective if the end result is valuable to
developing countries. The demands of the LMG and G-20 for unilateral concessions from
developed countries, especially on agriculture, may be regarded as inconsistent with the WTO
decision-making process, which is based on reciprocal concessions. Such demands may be viewed
as holdout attempts designed to extract excessive benefits. The effect of coercive tendering
therefore is to assist the US and EC in reducing the excessive demands of developing countries to
a level that better reflects the fair value of their votes. Without such coercive tendering, holdouts
could preclude or delay welfare-maximizing agreements.
In summary, those who believe that WTO agreements were adverse to the interests of
developing countries and that no deal would have been a better outcome in Doha and Hong Kong,
or that developing countries could have reached better and fair results in those conferences if not
for the coercive tendering employed by developed countries, will argue against such tendering
practices. However, if we believe that WTO agreements promote global growth and that the slow
progress of WTO negotiations is at least partly to blame on developing countries' insistence on
making excessive demands, we may be willing to countenance coercive tendering which is
designed to facilitate welfare-maximizing agreements.
(b) Agency costs (constituents):
In preference-decisions we need to examine whether vote-trading leads to decisions that harm or
benefit the interests of countries’ constituents. The question is whether without the option of
selling their vote, governments of developing countries would pursue policies that better maximize
the interests of their constituents, or otherwise harm their interests. This question requires us to
form a view regarding the effects of WTO decisions on the people of vote-sellers, essentially
developing countries. Again, there are two main views on the effects of vote-trading, both of
which are debatable.
The first view is that governments of developing countries may agree to vote for policies that
benefit developed countries in return for a consideration that benefits those governments at the
expense of the people of developing countries. As Narlikar points out: '...ministers can be tempted
or blackmailed with carrots and sticks such as IMF programmes, aid packages, free trade
arrangements and so forth...ministers have smaller shadows of the future than career diplomats. As
a result, ministers may be more willing to sign on to agreements for short-term gains even if the
agreement proves to be woefully inadequate, even harmful, in the longer run.'104 There is even a
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suggestion that delegates or government officials courted by the US and the EC derived personal
benefits from enhancing their relationships with powerful countries.105 This risk is pertinent in
WTO decisions where governments are expected to negotiate over permanent trade rules for the
long-term benefits of their constituents. Governments are less likely to face criticism for accepting
side-payments because the effects of conceding the long-term interests may not be apparent,
especially given the weakness of domestic accountability mechanisms in many developing
countries and the weak public scrutiny of WTO agreements through parliamentary ratification
procedures.106
The problem with this view however is that we do not necessarily know that without the sidepayments governments would actually pursue policies that better benefit their constituents. Even
without vote-trading, governments can pursue policies that benefit the governing elite and neglect
the interests of their constituents at large. Moreover, we do not necessarily know that the shortterm benefits will be less valuable to the relevant constituents as compared with the policies that
the relevant government would have pursued without vote-trading. While some of the sidepayments mentioned above seem to be negligible, other benefits are more valuable; for example, if
a poor country receives a valuable loan, the overall result may be in the interests of its people.
The second view is that vote-trading ameliorates agency costs (constituents). This view asserts
that vote-trading forces developing countries to open up their markets and abandon protectionist
policies. On this view, the freeing of trade is in the benefit of the people of developing countries,
because it increases welfare in the long run. Direct payments and aid can be used by developing
countries to build their capacity to compete, but even if such payments are not utilized for the
benefit of the relevant constituents or too small to be useful, the free trade policies promoted by
developed countries benefit the people of all countries by increasing global growth. It is possible,
therefore, to argue that vote-trading gives incentives to governments that protect specific national
groups to open up their markets for the benefit of their constituents, and in this way ameliorates
agency costs created by these governments' protectionism.
Like the first view, this view has weaknesses. In particular, it assumes too readily that free trade
benefits countries’ constituents. There are reasonable arguments that some protectionism would
favor people in developing countries. There is evidence that the benefits of global growth tend to
flow primarily to elites rather than the middle and low-income classes,107 and thus some
protectionism may be needed to cater to the latter's interests. Protectionist policies can also be
warranted by 'infant industry' considerations and local industries' inability to compete.
Whichever view we adopt, it is important to emphasize that the essence of the WTO is based on
internal-logrolling agreements under which countries exchange votes to secure policies that
benefit their own constituents, even if governments do so in a non-optimal way. Given that the
risk of agency costs is lower when the consideration for votes is not of financial or tangible
benefit, there is less concern with internal-logrolling agreements that presumably generate global
benefits and more concern with vote-buying and external-logrolling involving IMF or World Bank
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loans. The problem with the latter transactions, though, as I explain above, is that it is not possible
to determine conclusively whether they exacerbate or ameliorate agency costs without preestablished convictions regarding the effects of WTO decisions on the people of developing
countries.
D. The International Whaling Commission
1. Reported Cases of Vote-Trading
Countries in the IWC are largely divided into three groups: the pro-whaling countries, such as
Iceland, Norway and Japan; the anti-whalers, such as the UK, Australia, and the US; and finally,
the group of countries that either do not care much or do not care at all about whaling issues.
There is compelling evidence that in recent years Japan has consistently bought the votes of
many countries belonging to the third group with a view to buying several important decisions.108
Japan has not only paid members of the IWC, but has also paid countries to join the IWC and vote
in accordance with Japan’s interests. The money is paid through Japan’s Overseas Development
Assistance and usually invested in the fisheries industries of the selling countries. One report
states that Japan invested about $160 million between 1987 and 2001 in fisheries aid to Caribbean
countries, including St. Lucia, St. Vincent, St. Kitts & Nevis, Grenada, Dominica, and Antigua &
Barbuda.109 These countries consistently vote with Japan on virtually all proposed resolutions in
the IWC. Other small countries that vote with Japan include Tuvalu, Benin and Guinea. There is
also some evidence of external-logrolling. Japan trades votes in CITES CoP 11 for votes in the
IWC with several African countries that want to restart international trade in ivory.110 For
convenience, I refer to Japanese vote-buying and external-logrolling collectively as 'Japanese
vote-trading'. As a result of the Japanese vote-trading, the pro-whaling bloc has grown from 9
members in 2000 to approximately half of the members in 2006.
It should be pointed out that in order to pass a decision on key issues, such as a determination
of protected species, setting catch limits of whale species, the permissible intensity of whaling and
the designation of whale sanctuaries, the IWC must amend the Schedule to the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling ('ICRW') by a three-fourths majority.111 Other
resolutions are decided by a simple majority.
Three main issues were subject to controversy in the IWC in recent years. First, Japan has been
trying for several years to pass a resolution to lift the moratorium on commercial whaling effective
since 1986, but has failed to reach the required three-fourths majority.112 In 2006, however, a
108

See Alexander Gillespie, ‘Transparency in International Environmental Law: A Case Study of the International
Whaling Commission’, 14 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. (2002) 333, at 345-347; Paul Brown, ‘Fishing for Votes’, The
Guardian, 8 May 2002; Global Corruption Report, supra note 4, at 87-88; see related reports in the websites of
Greenpeace, at http://www.greenpeace.org/international and the International Fund for Animal Welfare, at
http://www.ifaw.org.
109
Petitjean Roget, ‘Socio-Economic and Political Aspects of the Aid Provided by Japan to the Fishing Industry in
the Small Independent Islands in the East Caribbean’, Eastern Caribbean Coalition for Environmental Awareness
(2002), at http://www.eccea.org/news/pdfs/SocEcJapAid_E.pdf.
110
Mike Danaher, ‘Why Japan Will Not Give up Whaling’, 14(2) Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change
(2002) 105, at 117.
111
Article III(2) and V, The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 2 December 1946, 161 U.N.T.S.
72.
112
Japan has made many proposals to mitigate the moratorium by allowing a limited quota of community-based
whaling along Japanese coasts. These proposals were all rejected; see IWC 52nd Report (2000); IWC 53rd Report
(2001); IWC 54th Report (2002); IWC 55th Report (2003); IWC 56th Report (2004); IWC 57th Report (2005); IWC

29

declaratory resolution stating that the moratorium is no longer necessary and urging the IWC to
resume commercial whaling on a sustainable basis was passed by a simple majority.113 The second
issue concerns proposals to establish whale sanctuaries in the South Pacific and in the South
Atlantic. The Japanese vote-trading bloc was able to prevent these proposals from being
accepted.114 The third issue is the design of the new compliance mechanism, namely, the Revised
Management Scheme ('RMS'). The debate over the RMS concerns several interrelated issues,
including the level and intensity of inspection, the utilization of DNA technology to track whale
products, recording information pertaining to animal welfare, and the composition of the
compliance review committee. Whaling countries argue for a less stringent compliance
mechanism but, more fundamentally, appear to condition agreement to the RMS on the
resumption of sustainable commercial whaling.115
2. Category of Decision
Decisions on whale regulation in the IWC are 'judgment-decisions'. Countries are expected to
express their judgment on what should be the most appropriate measures for whale regulation in
accordance with specified criteria. Article V of the ICRW states that ‘…amendments of the
Schedule (a) shall be such as are necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of the
Convention and to provide for the conservation, development, and optimum utilization of the
whale resources; (b) shall be based on scientific findings;…and (d) shall take into consideration
the interests of the consumers of whale products and the whaling industry.’ The purposes of the
ICRW, as stated in the preamble, include: safeguarding whale stocks for future generations,
protecting whales from over-fishing, confining whaling to the species best able to sustain
exploitation, and ensuring proper and effective conservation.
3. Analysis of Vote-Trading
In order to assess whether vote-trading, especially the Japanese vote-trading, has facilitated gooddecisions or bad-decisions, we need to identify the collective good against which IWC decisions
should be evaluated. The problem with identifying the collective good is that it has been subject to
a major debate. There are two main views of the collective good in the IWC: the conservationist
view, under which whaling should be limited to sustainable levels, and the preservationist view
that advocates a total ban on whaling. To consider these views we first need to examine the
provisions of the ICRW. The ICRW contemplates safeguarding whales, but also sustainable
whaling, optimum utilization, and due regard to the interests of the whaling industry. The ICRW
also requires that whaling restrictions be based on scientific evidence. In fact, the preamble to the
ICRW expressly recognizes that increases in whale stocks will permit increases in the number of
whales that can be captured. Thus the ICRW clearly lends support to the conservationist view that
accepts whaling to the extent that the relevant species is not endangered. Proponents of the
conservationist view point especially to the fact that since the establishment of the IWC and the
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ban on commercial whaling, the number of whales has significantly increased. It is generally
accepted that the ban on commercial whaling is no longer justified by scientific evidence in
respect of certain species that are now abundant, especially the Grey Minke Whale.116
Preservationists, on the other hand, interpret the ICRW expansively to allow moral sentiments
towards whales to be given significant weight in IWC decisions. Whales have increasingly
become viewed as having human attributes and killing whales is perceived by many as immoral.117
Since the ICRW was signed in 1946, many countries, predominantly Australia, New Zealand, the
US and the UK, have gradually adopted a strong anti-whaling stance by ceasing whaling
operations and supporting extensive whaling restrictions. The current situation appears to be that
without the Japanese vote-trading a substantial majority of countries in the IWC would support a
permanent ban on all whaling, establishing more whale sanctuaries and a strict compliance regime.
Any view as to the effects of vote-trading depends on which view of the collective good is
adopted. Preservationists argue that Japanese vote-trading is designed to promote its own
individual interests. Japan views whaling as part of its national cultural identity, and strong
domestic interest groups put political pressure on the government to continue whaling.118 Japanese
vote-trading is thus harmful because it is employed to block anti-whaling policies, such as the
establishment of new sanctuaries and a stricter compliance mechanism. By contrast,
conservationists would argue that Japanese vote-trading is beneficial. Countries with no whaling
industry vote against whaling in order to appear 'greener' in the eyes of their public.119 These antiwhaling countries vote their interests - i.e. to show commitment to environmental issues - at the
expense of the collective good, properly defined in accordance with the ICRW to allow
sustainable whaling. It is not implausible to argue that most people would support limited
controlled whaling of abundant species if not for the false impression that all whales are
endangered. While Japan’s whaling views may be partly derived from its own interests, they also
reflect Japan’s judgment that scientific evidence supports a relaxation of anti-whaling measures.120
Japan, on this view, is a benevolent vote-buyer that buys votes for good-decisions.
A 'middle view' may be offered as accommodating the interests of both anti-whalers and
whalers. On the one hand, the IWC cannot ignore moral preferences that oppose whaling, but on
the other hand, some limited commercial whaling is justified given whalers' strong preferences. In
many respects, it seems that the current status quo, which is partly the consequence of Japan's
ability through vote-trading to block new anti-whaling policies, represents this middle view. The
moratorium and existing whale sanctuaries have led to a major increase in the number of whales,
while whaling countries continue to conduct some limited whaling under a reservation to the
moratorium121 or, like Japan, under the scientific exception to the ICRW.122 So long as the
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Japanese vote-trading bloc does not exceed the three-fourths majority required to overturn the
moratorium, an unlikely scenario at present, whaling will continue to be restricted to limited
amounts; yet, it will remain difficult for anti-whalers to introduce more expansive anti-whaling
policies.123 Interestingly, even though the IWC decision-making seems somewhat dysfunctional,
this status quo is actually close to the state of affairs contemplated by the ICRW.124
The middle view of the collective good may also be accommodated with political compromises
that are based on internal-logrolling agreements. The negotiations in recent years in the IWC
outside the scope of the annual meetings have been based on the idea that anti-whalers will agree
to a relaxation of the ban on commercial whaling and whaling nations will agree to establish a
strong enforcement and compliance mechanism125 This potential future compromise can be viewed
as an efficient logrolling compromise, under which each group of countries concedes its personal
bad-preferences in order to achieve a package of welfare-maximizing decisions. Anti-whaling
countries would concede their personal preference for a complete prohibition on whaling, while
whaling countries would concede their personal preference against a strong enforcement and
compliance mechanism, in favor of a deal to allow limited sustainable whaling and improve
enforcement.126
4. Conclusion
When we examine the results of applying the analysis to specific institutions, we see that in most
cases it is not possible to determine with certainty whether vote-trading is harmful or beneficial,
and in some cases there are good reasons to believe that vote-trading maximizes welfare.
Taking judgment-decisions first, despite the moral implications associated with such decisions,
vote-trading can have significant beneficial effects. I have argued above that the US paid countries
in order to induce them to agree to welfare-maximizing (albeit not optimal) decisions, in particular
the use of force against Iraq in the First Gulf War. The decision to use force in Haiti in 1994 and
the recognition of the CIS force in Georgia can also be regarded as good-decisions. While there is
no guarantee that vote-trading will never be used to facilitate bad-decisions, the failure of the US's
vote-trading attempts before the Second Gulf War shows that countries’ preferences and
reputational costs can limit the vote-buyer’s ability to buy votes for bad-decisions. In the GA,
there is evidence that election results facilitated through vote-trading are in many instances not
optimal, but there is no compelling evidence that vote-trading facilitated such results. In both
elections to the ICJ and elections to the SC, two main conflicting views can be put forward. One
holds that vote-trading reduces the quality of elected members, the other that it actually facilitates
the election of more qualified candidates. Both views have some evidential support, but it is
impossible to decide conclusively which better reflects the effects of vote-trading, especially
adopted.
122
Article VIII of ICRW permits IWC members to allow their nationals to kill whales for the purpose of scientific
research. Japan has been accused of misusing this exception to pursue commercial whaling.
123
While there is no evidence that anti-whalers currently buy votes, if Japan gets closer to attaining the three-fourths
majority it is possible that anti-whalers will then resort to vote-trading in order to prevent the resumption of
commercial whaling.
124
See David Victor, 'Whale Sausage: Why the Whaling Regime Does Not Need to Be Fixed', in Robert Friedheim
(ed), Toward a Sustainable Whaling Regime (2001) 292.
125
Gillespie, supra note 115.
126
Similarly, Japan may agree to the establishment of new sanctuaries in return for anti-whalers’ votes on relaxing the
requirements of the moratorium.

32

because we do not know whether but for the vote-trading countries would vote for better or
inferior candidates. In the IWC, the major problem is the uncertainty regarding which view of the
collective good should be adopted, the conservationist or preservationist. Without a reasonably
certain conception of the collective good, it is impossible to determine whether or not vote-trading
is undesirable. It should be emphasized that the Japanese vote-trading strategy has been successful
only in maintaining the status quo in the IWC, by blocking anti-whaling policies but failing to
facilitate pro-whaling ones. This status quo is actually consistent with the middle view of the
collective good that balances between the preservationist and conservationist views. The middle
view is also consistent with the emerging compromise in the IWC, which is based on an internallogrolling deal between whaling and anti-whaling nations to relax the ban on commercial whaling
but strengthen compliance mechanisms.
In preference-decisions, essentially the decisions of the WTO, the results of the analysis are
similar. It is clear that certain transactions are, at least on balance, efficient, in particular internallogrolling agreements that form the basis of the WTO decision-making process by facilitating
mutual concessions on trade issues. Without such internal-logrolling it would be virtually
impossible to achieve consensus over new WTO decisions. But the effect of other vote-trading
transactions is subject to controversy, and ultimately depends on how we view the overall outcome
of the WTO decision-making. While vote-trading may be viewed as part of a coercive tendering
strategy employed by powerful nations to pressure developing countries to agree to policies they
genuinely object to, others may contend that coercive tendering is simply a tool for preventing
holdout countries from blocking welfare-maximizing decisions on liberalizing world trade.
Likewise, while we may view vote-trading, especially vote-buying deals, as exacerbating agency
costs (constituents) by allowing governments to sell votes to further their own interests at the
expense of their constituents, vote-trading may also be viewed as ameliorating agency costs
(constituents) if we consider WTO decisions that remove protectionist obstacles to free trade to be
in the interests of the people of developing countries.
In light of this analysis, it would not make sense to introduce policy measures against votetrading in international institutions. At least so far as the four institutions discussed in this paper
are concerned, there is not one clear case where vote-trading has reduced global welfare, and there
is substantial evidence that vote-trading can generate benefits. Even if we believe that vote-trading
is costly overall, it is hard to contemplate an efficient mechanism to address its costs. Any express
legal rule that prohibits all or some types of vote-trading would suffer from severe adjudication
and enforcement costs, as most vote-trading deals take place behind the scenes.127 There is also a
risk that countries that are better at hiding their vote-trading attempts will free-ride on countries
that comply with such a rule. Moreover, to the extent that a rule against vote-trading would
prevent powerful vote-buyers from achieving favorable decisions in a certain institution, it may
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simply induce them to exit that institution.128
The remaining questions in regard to vote-trading call for further research. There is a need for
more case studies and more facts, for example: the frequency of vote-trading in the SC; whether
better judges would be elected without vote-trading; to what extent reputation affects countries’
incentives to buy or sell votes; the value developing countries can expect to obtain by acting
collectively in the WTO, etc. In addition, the analysis should be applied to more international
institutions, such as the Codex Alimentarius and the World Health Organization, where votetrading presumably takes place as well. It would also be interesting to extend the analysis to other
international organizations with non-state members, such as the International Standards
Organization and the International Olympic Committee.129
Finally, I note that the usefulness of vote-trading in judgment-decisions that implicate serious
moral issues raises concerns about the practicality of the very idea of judgment-decisions made by
states through a voting process. It may be unrealistic to expect self-interested countries with duties
to their own constituents to vote for the collective good. In the domestic context, judgmentdecisions are made only by professionals, rather than by self-interested political actors. We may
question whether all judgment-decisions should be transformed into preference-decisions, though
under a system where countries have better incentives to represent broader interests than solely
their own. The incentives for countries to pursue the collective good are unsatisfactory, leaving
significant scope for vote-trading to shape decisions and voting outcomes.
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